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Abstract
It is part of the current wisdom that the Liar and similar semantic
paradoxes can be taken care of by the use of certain non-classical
multivalued logics. It is also well-known that some of these logics can
be characterized by means of two-valued semantics. An immediate
consequence of this is that there are two-valued logics that support
a transparent truth predicate. In this paper I want to suggest that
these logics are not just interesting from a formal point of view but
also from a philosophical perspective. In particular, I will argue that
the two-valued presentation of these logics has a number of advantages
over the more usual presentations.
1 Introduction
It is part of current wisdom that the Liar and similar semantic paradoxes
can be taken care of without compromising the transparency of the truth
predicate1 by the use of certain non-classical multivalued logics. This much
was shown by Kripke in his classical paper [14] on truth, where he uses three-
valued interpretations with t1, 1
2
, 0u as the set of semantic values. His fixed-
point construction starts from a classical interpretation for a first-order base
language L without a truth predicate Trpxq and provides a way to generate an
interpretation for the language LTr containing such a predicate. Although the
fixed-point construction can be carried out with several valuation schemata,
here I will only focus on Kleene’s strong valuation schema. According to this
schema, negation  is defined as 1 minus the value of the negated formula
1By a transparent truth predicate I mean a predicate Trpxq such that for every formula
φ, Trxφy and φ are everywhere intersubstitutable (where xφy is a name for the sentence φ).
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and disjunction _ is defined as the maximum of the values of the disjuncts.
It is easy to define the other logical connectives in terms of these two2. Since
I want to discuss semantic paradoxes, I assume, as usual, that LTr has some
way to talk about itself. More specifically, for each formula φ of LTr there is
a term xφy that is the name of that formula. Later on I will make this more
precise. Kripke’s insight is that we can construct different strong Kleene
interpretations with the additional feature that the value assigned to any
formula Trxφy is the same as the value assigned to φ itself. That is, it is
possible to provide theories based on strong Kleene interpretations where
truth behaves as a transparent predicate.
The logics K3 and LP are notorious examples of this (for an overview
of these logics see [16]). The only important (non-philosophical) difference
between K3 and LP has to do with the consequence relation defined by each
of these logics. In K3 an argument is valid if it preserves the value 1, while
in LP an argument is valid if it preserves the non-0 values. In other words,
whereas K3 takes 1 as the only designated value, LP takes both 1 and 12 .
This difference has a major impact on the set of valid inferences and formulas.
Crucially, both the Law of Excluded Middle and Reductio ab Absurdum fail
in K3 but not in LP 3. And both Explosion and Disjunctive Syllogism fail in
LP but not in K3.
However, they have an important feature in common. Consider a Liar
sentence λ saying of itself that it is false4. Both inK3 and LP λ is categorized
by means of the intermediate value 1
2
. This gives a consistent assignment to
λ since the value of  φ is defined as 1 minus the value of φ for any formula
φ. So we can let the values of λ, Trx λy, Trxλy and Trxλy be all 1
2
.
Even though this idea works quite well, it is well-known that these logics
can also be characterized by means of two-valued semantics. The four ways
of doing this I know of are: Routley star semantics, relational semantics,
partial semantics and bivaluation semantics (see [16] for the first two, [13]
for the third and [7] for the fourth5). In this paper I will present a formal
semantics based on a more recent approach developed by Arnon Avron and
Iddo Lev in [2]. The idea, roughly, is to define negation by means of a
non-deterministic matrix6. This will allows us to obtain a transparent truth
2I will ignore the quantifiers for now. For my purposes they bring extra complications
without adding interesting insights.
3Moreover, given that 12 is not designated and that for each formula there is an assign-
ment that gives it 12 , K3 has no tautologies at all.
4I won’t concern myself at this point on how to get self-reference. If the reader prefers,
she can take λ to be equivalent to the sentence asserting its own falsehood.
5Actually, this type of semantics has been known since [11], where a treatment of Da
Costa’s Cn-systems in terms of bivaluations is offered.
6Some of the points I am going to argue for below could have been made with the
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predicate and, crucially, there will be no need to introduce a third semantic
category7. As I will later show, the idea that the semantic paradoxes do
not require the postulation of a third semantic category raises a number of
interesting philosophical issues. The main contribution of this paper is to
discuss some of those issues and to argue for the claim that the two-valued
presentation of these logics has a number of advantages over the more usual
presentations.
Its structure is as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of the
idea of a non-deterministic matrix. Section 3 shows in which sense some
of these non-deterministic matrices are compatible with a transparent truth
predicate. More specifically, it is observed that by making negation non-
deterministic we can obtain two-valued versions of the theories K3 and LP .
In section 4 it is shown how to give a Kripke-style definition of the truth
predicate in these two-valued logics. In section 5 I consider a number of
philosophical issues with the non-deterministic account of negation and I
briefly sketch another way in which a non-deterministic account of the con-
nectives might be helpful with semantic paradoxes. Section 6 contains some
concluding remarks.
2 Non-deterministic matrices
Intuitively, in a non-deterministic framework there is at least one connective
such that you cannot completely determine the value of a compound formula
involving that connective even if you know the values of all the atomic for-
mulas of the language. In other words, you need to make a non-deterministic
choice between the values in a certain set. This idea can be spelled out
rigorously (a more detailed account can be found in [1]):
Definition (NDMatrix) A non-deterministic matrix for a language L is a
tupleM = ă V ,D,O ą, where:
• V is a non-empty set of values,
• D is a non-empty proper subset of V , and
• O is a set of functions such that for every n-ary connective ˛ in L, there
is a corresponding function ˛M in O such that ˛M: Vn ÝÑ 2V ´∅.8
framework of bivaluations as well. But for reasons that will become clear in section 5, I
prefer to use the non-deterministic account.
7I’ll have more to say on the idea of a ‘semantic category’ in section 5. For now, I’ll
use the term somewhat informally.
8The reason for excluding the empty set is that it is not straightforward how to compute
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Of course, V is meant to be a set of truth-values and D a set of designated
values. The interesting part of the definition has to do with the set O of
functions for the non-deterministic connectives. In a deterministic matrix,
for each n-ary connective ˛ in L there is a corresponding function ˛M such
that ˛M: Vn ÝÑ V . The function takes a certain n-tuple of values in Vn
and outputs a value in V . In the case of non-deterministic connectives, the
co-domain of the corresponding function is the set of sets of values 2V ´ ∅,
rather than the set of values V .
Also notice that deterministic matrices are a special case of non-determi-
nistic matrices. More specifically, for each n-ary connective ˛ in a determin-
istic matrix M which is interpreted as a function ˛M: Vn ÝÑ V , we can
build a non-deterministic matrixM1 where that connective can be taken as
a function that only outputs singleton values, that is, ˛M1 : Vn ÝÑ tA Ď V :
|A| “ 1u. By doing this we obtain a non-deterministic matrix with connec-
tives that mimic the behavior of the deterministic connectives.
It is straightforward to characterize the usual notions of valuation, satis-
faction, validity, and so on, for non-deterministic matrices. For example, a
valuation is defined in the following way:
Definition (V aluation) Let FormL denote the set of formulae of the lan-
guage L. A valuation in M is a function I : FormL ÝÑ V such that for
each n-ary connective ˛ of L, the following holds for all φ1, ..., φn P FormL:
Ip˛pφ1, ..., φnqq P ˛MpIpφ1q, ..., Ipφnqq
Notice that since ˛MpIpφ1q, ..., Ipφnqq gives a set of values rather than a
single value, we use ‘P’ instead of ‘=’ in the previous definition. With this
new notion of valuation, the concepts of Satisfaction and V alidity can be
defined as usual.
3 Two-valued non-deterministic logics
It is clear from the definition of a non-deterministic matrix that there are
many ways in which a matrix can be non-deterministic. For my purposes, it
is enough to consider only two-valued matrices where every connective but
negation is deterministic.
Let L be a propositional language with one unary connective  and two
binary connectives _ and ^. LetM1 = ă V1, D1, O1 ą, where:
• V1 = t1, 0u,
the value of compound formulae where at some step of the computation we have as input
the empty set.
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• D1 = t1u, and
• O1 “ t M1 ,_M1 ,^M1u is defined in the following way:
 M1
1 {0}
0 {1,0}
_M1
1 1 {1}
1 0 {1}
0 1 {1}
0 0 {0}
^M1
1 1 {1}
1 0 {0}
0 1 {0}
0 0 {0}
The matrixM1 characterizes a non-deterministic negation. In particular,
it is compatible with the existence of valuations I such that for some formula
φ, Ipφq “ Ip φq “ 0. This matrix corresponds to the conditional-free frag-
ment of the logic CLaN , developed in [5].
Of course, negation can be modified in yet another way. Let L be as
before and letM2 be just asM1 except for the negation connective, which
is now defined in the following way:
 M2
1 {1,0}
0 {1}
M2 also characterizes a non-deterministic negation. But this time there can
be valuations I such that for some formula φ, Ipφq “ Ip φq “ 1. As it is
pointed out in [2], this matrix corresponds to the conditional-free fragment
of the well-known logic CLuN , also developed in [5].
It is straightforward to check thatM1 is a paracomplete logic and that
M2 is a paraconsistent logic, given that *M1 φ _  φ, and φ ^  φ *M2 ψ.
What I find interesting about these matrices is that they are compatible
with a transparent truth predicate, even though they are two-valued. I have
already mentioned that both the paracomplete three-valued logic K3 and
the paraconsistent three-valued logic LP can support a transparent truth
predicate. But it is not hard to show that every K3-countermodel can be
turned into anM1-countermodel, and also that every LP -countermodel can
be turned into anM2-countermodel9.
The proofs of these facts are straightforward modifications of the proofs
offered in [5] for CLaN and CLuN . To prove the first fact, the idea is
to replace all assignments of the value 1
2
by 0, and leave everything else
9Just for the sake of completeness, there is a third two-valued matrix M3 with a
non-deterministic negation which is also compatible with a transparent truth predicate.
M3 is given by
Australasian Journal of Logic (12:1) 2014, Article no. 4
49
untouched. For the second, we need to replace all assignments of the value
1
2
by 1, and leave everything else untouched.
Fact 3.1 If Γ (M1 ∆, then Γ (K3 ∆10.
Proof sketch. If Γ *K3 ∆, then there is a K3-valuation IA such that IA
assigns every γ in Γ the value 1 and assigns every δ in ∆ either 0 or 1
2
.
Now construct a valuation IB which is exactly as IA except that it assigns 0
whenever IA assigns 1
2
. More specifically, IB is such that for each formula φ:
• if IApφq “ 1
2
, then IBpφq “ 0, and
• if IApφq ‰ 1
2
, then IBpφq “ IApφq.
Clearly, IB is anM1-valuation and IB assigns every γ in Γ the value 1 and
every δ in ∆ the value 0. So Γ *M1 ∆.
This means that M1 is a sublogic of K3. Hence, M1 is a paracomplete
two-valued! consistent (non-deterministic) matrix that supports a transpar-
ent truth predicate.
Fact 3.2 If Γ (M2 ∆, then Γ (LP ∆.
Proof sketch. Similar to the proof of Fact 3.1.
This shows that M2 is a sublogic of LP . Therefore, M2 is a paracon-
sistent two-valued! non-trivial (non-deterministic) matrix that supports a
transparent truth predicate.
It has been proved that there are soundness and completeness results
for these matrices. Actually, this follows from a more general fact proved by
Avron and Zamansky in [3]. In a multiple conclusion sequent calculus setting,
the logic ofM1 is sound and complete with respect to (propositional) classical
logic minus the following rule:
 M3
1 {1,0}
0 {1,0}
For those interested, it turns out that M3 is the conditional-free fragment of the (para-
complete and paraconsistent) logic CloN developed in [5] and that it is a subtheory of the
four-valued logic of first degree entailment FDE. I should also note that there is a fourth
logic in this family, sometimes called S3. Accordingly, there is a fourth matrix, which I’ll
callM4, which can be obtained fromM3 by admitting only thoseM3-valuations where
negations behaves non-deterministically either for input 0 or for input 1, but not both.
It turns out thatM4 is a subtheory of the three-valued logic S3. See [12], p.81 for more
details on S3.
10The reader can take single conclusions if she likes. At this point nothing important
depends on this, except that the author likes multiple conclusions better.
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Γ, φ $ ∆Right 
Γ $ ∆, φ
And the logic ofM2 is sound and complete with respect to (propositional)
classical logic11 minus the rule:
Γ $ ∆, φ
Left 
Γ, φ $ ∆
This is no surprise, as each of these rules correspond to a row in the
matrix for  . If we take Right away,  “doesn’t know” what to do with
false formulas, while if we take Left away,  “doesn’t know” what to do
with true formulas.
An obvious problem with these logics is that they are too weak. M1 is a
proper sublogic of K3 and thatM2 is a proper sublogic of LP , as we can see
below (CL stands for ‘classical logic’):
CL
LPK3
FDE
M1 M2
M3
In fact, these logics are much weaker than their three-valued cousins. For
example, we cannot define conjunction (disjunction) in terms of disjunction
(conjunction) and negation. Moreover, there is no interaction at all12 between
disjunction and conjunction since all the de Morgan Laws fail in these logics.
11Since one of the negation rules will not be available, in both cases we need to make a
minor adjustment: φ $ φ is an initial sequent for all formulas, and not only for all atomic
formulas.
12Except for some negation-free inferences like the one from φ^ψ to φ_ψ and the one
from φ^ pψ _ χq to pφ^ ψq _ pφ^ χq.
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There is a well-known way to fix this (see again [5]). Here we show, once
again, that thanks to the aid of non-deterministic matrices, this maneuver
does not require the postulation of a third semantic category. LetM`1 and
M`2 be as the matrices M1 and M2, respectively, plus the following extra
requirements:
• For each formula φ and every valuation I:
1. Ipφq “ Ip  φq.
2. Ip pφ^ ψqq “ Ip φ_ ψq.
3. Ip pφ_ ψqq “ Ip φ^ ψq.13
The matrixM`1 corresponds to the conditional-free fragment of the logic
CLaNs and the matrixM`2 corresponds to the conditional-free fragment of
the logic CLuNs, both also developed in [5]. It is possible to prove thatM`1
and K3 characterize the same set of valid inferences and that M`2 and LP
also characterize the same set of valid inferences.
Fact 3.3 Γ (M`1 ∆ if and only if Γ (K3 ∆.
Proof sketch. The proof of the left-to-right direction is similar to the proof
of Fact 3.1. For the other direction, assume that Γ *M`1 ∆. Then there is an
M`1 -valuation IA such that IA assigns every γ in Γ the value 1 and assigns
every δ in ∆ the value 0. Now construct a valuation IB which is exactly as
IA except that it assigns 1
2
to a formula φ whenever IA assigns 0 to both φ
and  φ. More specifically, IB is such that for any atomic formula φ:
• IBpφq “ 1
2
whenever IApφq “ IAp φq “ 0, and
• IBpφq “ IApφq otherwise.
It is not hard to see that IB is a K3-valuation and that for every formula φ
it holds that if IApφq “ 1, then IBpφq “ 1, and that if IApφq “ 0, then either
IBpφq “ 0 or IBpφq “ 1
2
. It follows that for every γ P Γ, IBpγq “ 1 and for
every δ P ∆, IBpδq “ 0 or IBpδq “ 1
2
. This means that Γ *K3 ∆.
As usual, an analogous result can be proved for the dual LP .
13If quantifiers were also available, we would need to stipulate in addition that for each
formula φ and every valuation I:
– IpDx φq “ Ip @xφq.
– Ip@x φq “ Ip Dxφq.
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Fact 3.4 Γ (M`2 ∆ if and only if Γ (LP ∆.
Proof sketch. For the right-to-left direction, the only relevant difference with
respect to the previous proof is that we let IB be exactly as IA except that
for each atomic formula φ, IBpφq “ 1
2
whenever IApφq “ IAp φq “ 1, and
IBpφq “ IApφq otherwise.
These results show thatM`1 andM`2 are two-valued versions of K3 and
LP , respectively. The third value need not be there if negation is character-
ized by a non-deterministic matrix.
These matrices also enjoy soundness and completeness results. However,
the usual proof-theoretic presentations of the logics K3 and LP use three-
sided sequents, which are fairly natural when the matrices are three-valued.
However, for our two-valued logics M`1 and M`2 a different presentation
seems more appropriate. Again using sequents, it can be proved that the
M`1 -matrices (M`2 -matrices) are sound and complete with respect to the
calculus for M1 (M2) plus the following rules (see [8] for a more detailed
presentation):
Γ, φ $ ∆
L  
Γ,  φ $ ∆
Γ $ φ,∆
R  
Γ $   φ,∆
Γ, φ_ ψ $ ∆
L ^
Γ, pφ^ ψq $ ∆
Γ $  φ_ ψ,∆
R ^
Γ $  pφ^ ψq,∆
Γ, φ^ ψ $ ∆
L _
Γ, pφ_ ψq $ ∆
Γ $  φ^ ψ,∆
R _
Γ $  pφ_ ψq,∆
What happens to λ and other problematic sentences in these logics?
While in three-valued logics these sentences are dealt with by the introduc-
tion of a new semantic category, the logics presented in the previous section
require no such thing. In particular, IM
`
1 (λ) = 0 and IM
`
2 (λ) = 1. These
assignments are unproblematic. On the one hand, since inM`1 we can have
IM
`
1 pφq “ IM`1 p φq “ 0 for some formulas φ, the following holds if a truth
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predicate is available:
IM
`
1 pλq “ IM`1 pTrxλyq “ IM`1 p Trxλyq “ 0.
Analogously, since in M`2 we can have IM
`
2 pφq “ IM`2 p φq “ 1 for some
formulas φ, the following holds:
IM
`
2 pλq “ IM`2 pTrxλyq “ IM`2 p Trxλyq “ 1.
So, once a non-deterministic negation is present, there is no need to have a
third truth-value to make truth a transparent predicate.
4 A definition of truth
This section is devoted to show that we can provide a two-valued fixed-point
semantics for a language containing a truth predicate. Although given the
results of the previous section, this fact should be immediate, it is still in-
structive to see how exactly the construction can be carried out. This will
help us understand how the truth predicate can be appropriately interpreted
in a two-valued setting and, specially, how paradoxical sentences can be han-
dled.
Here is a sketch of how the construction works for M`1 . Let L be the
language of Peano arithmetic and let Trpxq be L plus a truth predicate Trpxq.
In what follows we will only consider interpretations Iδ (where δ is an ordinal
number) for LTr where the arithmetic literals (i.e. atomic formulas and their
negations) have their usual truth-value and the domain is exactly ω14. Let
xφy denote the (Gödel code of the) formula φ and let IδpTr`q and IδpTr´q be
the extension and the antiextension of the predicate Trpxq at Iδ, respectively.
We need to impose an additional condition on the interpretations:
• For all formulas φ and all interpretations Iδ, it holds that Iδp Trpxφyqq “
IδpTrpx . φyqq15, where, as usual,  . is a function that outputs (the code
of) the formula  φ if it is given (the code of) the formula φ as input.
14Observe that because negation is non-deterministic, it is not enough to stipulate that
the arithmetic part of the vocabulary has its intended meaning in all interpretations, we
also need to fix the values of the negations of the atomic formulas at every interpretation.
Otherwise there will be interpretations where atomic arithmetic sentences will have the
same value as their negation.
15Notice that in this respect, the truth predicate is no different from the connectives.
In fact, if we were to provide a sequent calculus for the theory extended with the
truth predicate, in addition to the usual rules for formulas of the form Trxφy, we would
need left and right rules for formulas of the form  Trxφy. More specifically, we would need:
Γ, T rx φy $ ∆
L Tr
Γ, Trxφy $ ∆
Γ $ Trx φy,∆
R Tr
Γ $  Trxφy,∆
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As usual we define a jump operator J : Pω Ñ Pω on interpretations for
LTr. This operator is defined as follows:
J pIδpTr`qq “ txφy : Iδpφq “ 1u.
So J yields, if applied to a set which is the extension of the truth predi-
cate, another set which is the new extension of the truth predicate. Since
the matrix is two-valued, we can define the antiextension of the truth predi-
cate at any interpretation Iδ as follows:
IδpTr´q “ ω ´ IδpTr`q.
We will say that the operator J is monotone if and only if IαpTr`q Ď
IβpTr`q implies J pIαpTr`qq Ď J pIβpTr`qq. The monotonicity of J entails
the existence of fixed points for J , i.e., interpretations IδpTr`q such that
J pIδpTr`qq “ IδpTr`q.
Intuitively, the idea is that we start with an interpretation I0 that assigns
a consistent (perhaps empty) extension to the truth predicate. Since negation
is non-deterministic, the construction is such that some formulas and their
negations will be in the antiextension of the truth predicate. Although some
true formulas might still be in the antiextension of the truth predicate at
I0, the jump operator successively fixes this situation by including more and
more Gödel codes of true formulas in the extension of the truth predicate in
a monotonic way. This means that the sets
I0pTr`q,J pI0pTr`qq,J pJ pI0pTr`qqq, ....
form an increasing sequence16, whereas the sets
I0pTr´q,J pI0pTr´qq,J pJ pI0pTr´qqq, ....
form a decreasing sequence.
To show how this works properly, we first need the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. If IαpTr`q Ď IβpTr`q, then for every formula φ of LTr, if
Iαpφq “ 1, then Iβpφq “ 1, and if Iβpφq “ 0, then Iαpφq “ 0.
Proof. Since there are just two truth-values, we only need to establish the first
claim, from which the second one follows. The claim is proven by induction
on the complexity of φ, but we have to consider each kind of positive formula
16More formally, we obtain an increasing sequence I0pTr`q, I1pTr`q,
I2pTr`q,...,IωpTr`q, Iω`1pTr`q,.... in this way:
• For successor ordinals α` 1, Iα`1pTr`q “ J pIαpTr`qq “ txφy : Iαpφq “ 1u, and
• For limit ordinals Λ, IΛpTr`q “ ŤβăΛ IβpTr`q.
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and each kind of negated formula. Assume that IαpTr`q Ď IβpTr`q. Then
we have the following cases:
• φ is an atomic arithmetical formula or the negation of an atomic arith-
metical formula. Since the truth of purely arithmetical formulas is not
affected by what is assigned to Trpxq, for all α and β, Iαpφq “ Iβpφq.
• φ is of the form Trpxψyq. Assume that IαpTrxψyq “ 1. Then xψy P
IαpTr`q. Since IαpTr`q Ď IβpTr`q, xψy P IβpTr`q. Hence, IβpTrxψyq “
1.
• φ is of the form  Trpxψyq. Here we need to use the fact that for
each interpretation Iδ, Iδp Trpxψyqq “ IδpTrpx . ψyqq. Assume that
Iαp Trxψyq “ 1. Then IαpTrx . ψyq “ 1, and so x . ψy P IαpTr`q.
Since IαpTr`q Ď IβpTr`q, we can infer that x . ψy P IβpTr`q, which in
turn gives IβpTrpx . ψyqq “ 1 and then Iβp Trxψyq “ 1.
• φ is of the form   ψ. We use the fact that for each interpretation Iδ,
δ, Iδp  ψq “ Iδpψq. Assume that Iαp  ψq “ 1. Hence, Iαpψq “ 1.
By the inductive hypothesis, Iβpψq “ 1, and so Iβp  ψq “ 1.
• φ is of the form ψ ^ χ. Straightforward.
• φ is of the form  pψ^χq. We use the fact that for each interpretation
Iδ, Iδp pψ ^ χqq “ Iδp ψ _  χq. Assume that Iαp pψ ^ χqq “ 1.
It follows that Iαp ψ _  χq “ 1, which means that Iαp ψq “ 1 or
Iαp χq “ 1. By the inductive hypothesis we can infer that Iβp ψq “ 1
or Iβp χq “ 1. So it follows that Iβp ψ _  χq “ 1, and therefore
Iβp pψ ^ χqq “ 1.
• φ is of the form ψ _ χ. Straightforward.
• φ is of the form  pψ_χq. We use the fact that for each interpretation
Iδ, Iδp pψ _ χqq “ Iδp ψ ^  χq. Assume that Iαp pψ _ χqq “ 1.
It follows that Iαp ψ ^  χq “ 1, which means that Iαp ψq “ 1 and
Iαp χq “ 1. By the inductive hypothesis we can infer that Iβp ψq “ 1
and Iβp χq “ 1. So it follows that Iβp ψ ^  χq “ 1, and therefore
Iβp pψ _ χqq “ 1.
This completes the proof17.
17Well, not quite. We still need to consider the quantifiers. For formulas of the form
 Dxφ, we use its equivalence with @x φ, and for formulas of the form  @xφ, we use
its equivalence with Dx φ. Formulas of the form Dxφ and @xφ present no additional
complications.
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As a corollary we can obtain the following:
Lemma 4.2 (Monotonicity of J ). The sequence enjoys the following mono-
tonicity property: If IαpTr`q Ď IβpTr`q, then J pIαpTr`qq Ď J pIβpTr`qq
and J pIβpTr´qq Ď J pIαpTr´qq.
Proof. As before, it is enough to prove only one of the claims. So assume
that xφy P J pIαpTr`qq. This means that Iαpφq “ 1. By Lemma 4.1, we can
infer that Iβpφq “ 1. Therefore, xφy P J pIβpTr`qq.
Because of the usual cardinality considerations, at some point the antiex-
tension of the truth predicate stops decreasing and its extension stops in-
creasing. And so we reach a fixed point.
Theorem 4.3 (Existence of fixed point for J ). The construction has the
fixed point property. That is, there are interpretations Iδ such that:
• J pIδpTr`qq “ IδpTr`q, and
• J pIδpTr´qq “ IδpTr´q.
Such interpretations deal with Trpxq in the desired way. If Iδ is a fixed
point for J , then for all sentences φ of LTr it holds that:
Iδpφq “ IδpTrxφyq.
What about M`2 ? For M`2 the idea is similar, but instead of assigning
a consistent extension to the truth predicate at I0, we assign it a consistent
antiextension at I0 and this time the jump operator includes more and more
Gödel codes of false formulas in the antiextension of the truth predicate in a
monotonic way18.
5 Making sense of two-valued non-deterministic
logics
Although technically attractive, it might be argued that these logics have
no real philosophical interest. In this section I’ll show why I disagree. The
absence of a third truth-value gives us a number of very desirable features.
Firstly, there is a nice symmetry between truth and falsity. A valid argument
is both truth-preserving from premises to conclusions and falsity-preserving
18We can deal with natural numbers that do not code formulas in both M`1 and M`2
by putting them in the antiextension of the truth predicate.
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from conclusions to premises. I consider this to be an advantage over three-
valued approaches likeK3 and LP , in which either falsity-preservation fails or
truth-preservation fails19. In [21], discussing single-premiss, single-conclusion
arguments, Alan Weir claims that
(...) I take it as constitutive of the notion of logical consequence
that if the premiss is true the conclusion is true and if the con-
clusion is false the premiss is false. The second, upwards falsity-
preservation direction is often omitted, probably because in clas-
sical bivalent semantics it follows from the first, but I see no
reason at all for an asymmetrical treatment of downwards truth-
preservation and upwards falsity-preservation.
Although I wouldn’t go as far as saying that the symmetry between truth
and falsity is constitutive of the notion of logical consequence, I do think that
the asymmetry is an odd feature that should be avoided whenever possible.
As he goes on to point out, in a multiple conclusion setting, this amounts
to the requirement that if all the premises are true, then at least one of the
conclusions has to be true and if all the conclusions are false, then at least
one of the premises has to be false. Since bivalence holds, this requirement
is fully satisfied inM`1 andM`2 , even with the transparent truth predicate
around.
Secondly, a defect usually attributed to three-valued approaches is that
they cannot appropriately specify the semantic status of those sentences that
obtain the third truth-value. In K3 it is not possible to truly express that the
Liar sentence is neither true nor false, while in LP the sentence expressing
that the Liar is both true and false is not only true, but also false. InM`1
andM`2 there is no such problem. InM`1 the sentence saying that the Liar
is true is in fact false, and in M`2 the sentence saying that the Liar is true
is in fact true. It might be argued that there is still a problem because in
M`1 the sentence saying that the Liar is false is itself false, and inM`2 the
sentence saying that the Liar is false is itself true. However, the sentence
saying that the Liar is false is just the Liar sentence, so to demand thatM`1
(M`2 ) should categorize this sentence as true (false) is just the same as to
require that it categorizes the Liar itself as true (false).
19Two remarks are in order. First, in the three-valued paracomplete and paraconsistent
logic S3 we do have both truth-preservation and falsity-preservation. But the problem
is that the resulting consequence relation is extremely weak. Second, there is a sense
in which there is truth- and falsity-preservation in LP , given that the value 12 is to be
interpreted as both-true-and-false. However, this is not enough to address the symmetry
issue: although valid LP -arguments preserve strict falsity, they might not preserve strict
truth.
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A related issue is whether there is a strengthened version of the Liar
affecting these theories. In many-valued theories, such as K3, there cannot
be a predicate expressing the concept of not being true. And similarly, in
theories like LP , there cannot be a predicate expressing the concept of strict
falsehood. If there were such predicates, there would be strengthened forms
of the Liar, which would make these theories trivial. However, this problem
is simply dissolved in M`1 and M`2 , where being not true is the same as
being strictly false. This is not to say that these theories are semantically
closed, in the sense that they can express every intelligible semantic concept.
For inM`1 there cannot be an exhaustive negation, and inM`2 there cannot
be an exclusive negation. But nevertheless, there is no strengthened Liar
different from the original Liar. To put it in a slogan: in these theories all
Liars are the same20.
Finally, a methodological advantage of presenting K3, LP and similar
logics by means of two-valued matrices (or two-sided sequent calculi) is that
we can see in a very precise way what the difference is between these logics
and classical logic. And the difference comes to this: negation behaves dif-
ferently. It behaves non-deterministically. In some cases, it leaves open what
the semantic value of the negated formula is. However, in the three-valued
(-sided) matrix (proof-theoretic) presentation, the difference is cashed out in
terms of the definition of validity. There is nothing particularly special about
negation21.
Let us move on to the potential problems these logics face. First, the
nice thing about logics such as K3 and LP is that they give us a conceptual
story as to why the Liar and similar sentences are special. In the first, we
reason in the following way. If we assume that the Liar is true, we can infer
a contradiction, and if we assume that it is false we can infer a contradiction
again. So it must be neither true nor false and hence the theory assigns it
the value 1
2
. In the second, we reason in the following way. If we assume that
the Liar is true, we can infer that it is false, and if we assume that it is false
we can infer that it is true. Hence, it must be both true and false and so the
theory assigns it the value 1
2
.
20One related problem that cannot be dissolved is posed by sentences such as ‘there is
a sentence that is neither true nor false’ and ‘there are no sentences that are true and
false’. The first will be false according to M`1 and the second will be true according to
M`2 , which seems quite unpleasant. However, in this regardM`1 andM`2 are no better
or worse than their three-valued versions, which evaluate the first sentence as neither true
nor false and the second as both true and false, respectively.
21As an anonymous referee correctly pointed out, this is only an advantage with respect
to the three-valued presentation of K3, LP and similar logics, so this criticism does not
affect the relational semantics nor the Routley star semantics, where the crucial change
has to do with the behavior of negation as well.
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What aboutM`1 andM`2 ? In the first one the Liar receives the value 0,
while in the second one it receives the value 1. Is there something interesting
to say about why this is so? I think there is. A plausible and very straight-
forward interpretation of these logics is in terms of acceptance and rejection.
In particular, we can make sense of (M`1 and (M`2 along the lines of [17].
Γ (M`i ∆ (for i “ 1, 2) amounts to the claim that we ought not to accept
each member of Γ and reject each member of ∆. For sentences, we can say
that if a sentence has the value 1, then that means that we ought to accept
it, and if a sentence has the value 0, that means that we ought not accept it
or, what amount to the same thing here, that we ought to reject it. So, in the
case ofM`1 we accept neither the Liar sentence nor its negation, and in the
case ofM`2 we accept them both. I think that, in this sense,M`1 andM`2
are “more honest” than their three-valued counterparts, in which bivalence is
tacitly reinstated in terms of the dichotomy between being designated and
being undesignated.
A second issue is that it is unclear to what extent M`1 and M`2 represent
“real” negations. A nice feature of most multivalued logics is that for formulas
that receive a classical value, the negation symbol behaves just as classical
negation. InM`1 andM`2 no such thing happens.
I think it is quite natural to understand non-deterministic connectives as
ambiguous expressions. In the case at hand, the non-deterministic character
of negation reflects the fact that negation is used ambiguously in philosoph-
ical theorizing about truth. In particular, negation behaves in one way in
contexts where paradoxical sentences are involved, and it behaves in a dif-
ferent way in paradox-free situations. For example, a paracomplete (para-
consistent) theorist claims that negation behaves as a non-exhaustive (non-
exclusive) operator when it occurs in a Liar sentence, but that it behaves
like boolean negation when it occurs in non-paradoxical sentences. In other
words, negation is ambiguous between two readings, an exhaustive (exclu-
sive) reading and a non-exhaustive (non-exclusive) reading. On one of those
readings, negation is always is able to form contradictories, on the other
sometimes it is not. One nice feature of the non-deterministic framework is
that it captures this ambiguity in a very neat way.
Moreover, we only need to worry about the ambiguity to a certain extent.
For one thing, the non-truth-functionality of negation only affects negations
of atomic formulas. Once the truth-values of all the literals are determined,
we can calculate the values of the rest of the formulas compositionally. But
more importantly, once we recognize that we are reasoning in a complete
(consistent) context, negation behaves just like boolean negation. More pre-
cisely, we can “recapture” classical reasoning in certain contexts, just as in K3
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and LP (see [9]). InM`1 classical reasoning holds exactly when the atomic
formulas in the conclusions respect excluded middle, and in M`2 classical
reasoning holds exactly when the atomic formulas in the premises are con-
tradictory. More rigorously, we can prove the following claim (where (CL is
the classical entailment relation, tγAt1 , ...., γAtm u is the set of atomic formulas
occurring in Γ and tδAt1 , ...., δAtn u is the set of atomic formulas occurring in
∆):
Fact 5.1 Γ (CL ∆ if and only if δAt1 _ δAt1 , ..., δAtn _ δAtn ,Γ (M`1 ∆.
Proof sketch. The right-to-left direction is straightforward. For the other
direction, assume that δAt1 _ δAt1 , ..., δAtn _ δAtn ,Γ *M`1 ∆. This means that
there is anM`1 -valuation IA such that IA assigns every γ in Γ the value 1,
every δ in ∆ the value 0 and δAti _  δAti the value 1 for every i such that
1 ď i ď n. Now construct a valuation IB which is exactly as IA except that
it assigns 1 to a formula  φ whenever IA assigns 0 to φ. More specifically,
IB is such that for each atomic formula φ:
• IBpφq “ IApφq, and
• IBp φq “ 1 whenever IApφq “ 0.
It is not hard to see that IB is a classical valuation and that for every γ P Γ,
IBpγq “ 1 and for every δ P ∆, IBpδq “ 0. This means that Γ *CL ∆.
As usual, there is an analogous “recovering” result forM`2 (where (CL,Γ
and ∆ are as before):
Fact 5.2 Γ (CL ∆ if and only if Γ (M`2 ∆, γAt1 ^ γAt1 , ..., γAtm ^ γAtm .22
Proof sketch. Similar to the proof of Fact 5.1.
The first fact amounts, roughly, to the idea that in situations where the
Law of Excluded Middle holds, that is, in complete situations,M`1 collapses
with classical logic. The second fact shows, again roughly, that in situations
where the Law of Non-Contradiction holds, that is, in consistent situations,
22In [6], Batens proved the following result (I’ve modified his notation slightly):
$CL φ if and only if $PIz pψ1 ^ ψ1q _ ..._ pψn ^ ψnq _ φ, for some ψ1, ..., ψn
where PIz is any paraconsistent extension of CLuN (which is actually PI in the nota-
tion of [6]). If we take into account of the existence of disjunctive normal form in CLuNs,
then we can take ψ1, ..., ψn to be atoms and thus obtain Fact 5.2 for CLuNs (and hence
its conditional-free fragment,M`2 ). I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for this finding.
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M`2 collapses with classical logic. These facts should be sufficient to dispel
the suspicion that negation behaves oddly even in non-paradoxical situa-
tions23.
Of course, as an anonymous referee observed, the fan of truth-functionality
might still be unhappy. But it is important to notice that the results above
show that once we find out whether the sentence being negated is paradoxical
or not, negation does behave truth-functionally. As I already pointed out,
in a paradox-free context, negation is just boolean negation. But if we are
reasoning with a paradoxical sentence, negation behaves just like the null
operator, leaving the value of the sentence being negated intact. In the case
of the Liar paradox and similar sentences, this is well motivated: the Liar
can be identified, roughly, with its own negation, so no change of truth-value
should be expected. So, once we find out whether the sentence being negated
is paradoxical or not, truth-functionality is restored.
A third worry is that there are other ways to provide two-valued formal se-
mantics for K3, LP and similar logics. As we mentioned in the introduction,
Routley star semantics, relational semantics, partial semantics and bivalua-
tion semantics have been given for these logics. However, in the first three
frameworks there are more than two semantic categories. By a semantic cat-
egory I mean, roughly, a way of semantically evaluating a sentence. Notice
that this may or may not coincide with the truth-values that we can assign
to a sentence in a given model-theoretic framework. For instance, although
partial semantics for K3 uses only two truth-values, it introduces a third se-
mantic category, that of lacking a truth-value. For another example consider
the relational semantics for LP , which also uses only two truth-values but
assigns them both to certain sentences. Once again, those sentences having
both truth-values belong to a third semantic category. The case of Routley
star semantics is harder to analyze, since the presence of possible worlds ob-
scures things a bit. The present framework, on the other hand, only requires
the postulation of two semantic categories.
The issue with bivaluations is different. As with the two-valued non-
deterministic matrices, bivaluations only require the postulation of two se-
mantic categories. In fact, it is known that any consequence relation that is
reflexive, monotonic, and obeys cut (i.e. any Tarskian consequence relation)
is exactly the consequence relation determined by some set of bivaluations.
Now, any matrix logic of the sort that I have been considering obeys these
principles. Because of this, its consequence relation has a bivaluational model
23There are other ways to recapture classical reasoning within these logics. A popular
strategy is to introduce a determinateness operator in the case of paracomplete theories,
and a consistency operator, in the case of paraconsistent theories. However, the introduc-
tion of these operators is by no means trivial in the presence of paradoxical sentences.
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theory24. So, from a technical standpoint, I could have used bivaluations in-
stead of non-deterministic matrices.
The reason why I prefer to use the latter framework and not the former
is that, from a more conceptual perspective, defining negation by means of
a non-deterministic matrix brings out one key aspect of negation that I’ve
mentioned before: negation behaves ambiguously. While non-deterministic
matrices capture this ambiguity very explicitly, this fact is somewhat con-
cealed in the framework of bivaluations.
Another worry -one that has been considered crucial- is thatM`1 andM`2
are still too weak. For instance,M`1 cannot have a classical conditional. For
suppose the conditional is defined in the following way:
ĄM`1
1 1 {1}
1 0 {0}
0 1 {1}
0 0 {1}
Then classical negation  C becomes definable:
 Cφ “def φ Ą  φ
Something similar holds for M`2 . This time the conditional is unprob-
lematic25, but there cannot be, among other things, an exclusive disjunction:
ÜM`2
1 1 {0}
1 0 {1}
0 1 {1}
0 0 {0}
In the presence of this connective, once again, classical negation  C be-
comes definable:
 Cφ “def pφ_ φq Ü φ
24A version of this result was used by Roman Suszko in the 70’s [20] to motivate the
claim that there are only two truth-values. This is sometimes called Suszko’s Thesis. A
proof of this result as well as some discussion can be found in [19].
25Well, this is true as long as there is no absurdity constant K available in the language
nor any sentence that is false in every valuation. Notice that without such things a
Curry sentence cannot be constructed. However, if there is an absurdity constant or a
sentence that is always false, the conditional can still be used to define classical negation:
 Cφ “def φ Ą K.
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So the theories we have considered, even in their strengthened versions,
are no stronger than K3 and LP . Any existing criticisms related to the
weakness of these logics apply toM`1 andM`2 as well. And there have been
many such criticisms, specially regarding the conditional of these theories.
K3 does not validate Identity (i.e. φ Ą φ), while LP does not validate Modus
Ponens. For example, [12] and [10] are attempts to add a strong conditional
connective to K3 and (a theory similar to) LP , respectively. I know of no
similar attempts for M`1 or M`2 , but we can safely claim that if a nice
conditional can be added to the former theories, it can also be added to the
latter theories. In any case, I will not go into the details here, since the jury
is still out on whether these attempts are successful or not.
Instead, I will finish by mentioning another strategy to cope with the
problem of the conditional. It should be clear by now that by taking a matrix
and making it non-deterministic, the original logic is (possibly) weakened.
This might not be a good strategy for matrices which are already charged of
being too weak, such as K3 and LP , but it can be a good idea for matrices
that are too strong.
One interesting example of this is the continuum-valued Łukasiewicz logic
Ł8 (see [16] for details), which is known to be too strong for transparent
truth in the sense that adding a transparent truth predicate to it produces
an ω-inconsistency26. So an interesting project is to see whether we can
obtain strong subtheories of Ł8 which are not ω-inconsistent by making its
conditional non-deterministic27. In the logic Ł8 the conditional is defined in
the following way:
vpφÑ ψq “
#
1 if vpφq ď vpψq
1´ pvpφq ´ vpψqq otherwise
However, we can also define a non-deterministic version of Łukasiewicz con-
ditional as follows:
vpφÑ ψq P
#
t1u if vpφq ď vpψq
V ´D otherwise
Although this conditional is rather weak, it is possible to set up several
restrictions on the set of admissible valuations in much the same way as we
26Semantically speaking, we say that a theory T is ω-inconsistent if and only if for some
formula φ and for each term t, T ( φrt{xs but T ( Dx φpxq. A proof that L8 plus a
transparent truth predicate is ω-inconsistent can be found in [18].
27Relevant to this sort of project is [4], where some (strong) subtheories of Ł8 are
identified axiomatically.
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did for the weak logicsM1 andM2. By doing so we can identify a number
of strong non-deterministic subtheories of Ł8 which are not obviously ω-
inconsistent28.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have argued that there are two-valued logics that can support
a transparent truth predicate as long as the matrix by which negation is de-
fined is non-deterministic. Moreover, we have seen how to obtain logics that
are two-valued versions of the well-known theories K3 and LP by the use
of such matrices. I have argued that the friends of paracomplete and para-
consistent logics have reasons to prefer the two-valued presentations of these
logics (specially the presentation in terms of non-deterministic matrices) over
other formal frameworks where an extra semantic category is overtly or tac-
itly introduced. The extra semantic category brings with it some unwanted
consequences which are avoided in the non-deterministic setting. I have also
sketched a very natural way of conceptually understanding this setting and I
have argued that a number of criticisms that are sometimes presented against
these logics are not too damaging.
These considerations can be used to show the power of non-deterministic
matrices. In fact, it remains to be explored whether this kind of matrices
can be useful in other philosophically relevant issues.
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